For one and a half millennia the metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle powerfully influenced the intellectual tradition of the West through being fused with the developing Christian theology and injections of Islamic thought. But that synthesis, which reached its apogee in the 13th century, ultimately proved unstable. Eventually, the model of scientific explanation carefully worked out in the medieval era collapsed and a different conception of science had to be worked out. But a number of other conceptual changes had also to occur as new metaphysical underpinnings were devised for explaining change. Amongst them were radically revised concepts of nature and of physics . The emergence of these new concepts in the 17th century heralded the invention of a new mathematical science: physics, in the modern sense.
The invention of physical science
Of course, the word "physics" was not new. It goes back at least as far as Aristotle's book of that name, but the ancient Greeks never used that word as the name of a science. The only commonality between the ancient and the modern uses of the word is that both aim at explaining worldly changes in terms of their 'natures'.
The Greek word physis , subsequently translated into Latin as natura , is derived from the verbal root phy-meaning to bring forth produce, to beget or engender, to grow, or spring forth. As Aristotle remarked, physis means "the genesis of growing things" ( Met. 1014 b 16). As he generalized this sense of the word, the physis or nature of an entity is the source of its characteristic behaviour, the 'that from which' that behaviour flows. Thus, the physis or nature of an entity is that by virtue of which it is uniquely itself ( Met . 1014 b [18] [19] [20] . That each kind of entity has a characteristic or 'natural' way of behaving is one of Aristotle's basic contentions. That towards which it 'naturally' tends (provided nothing else interferes or prevents its doing so) is its proper goal, or telos . In addition, biological entities have their own distinctive ways of behaving, as they grow towards maturity, towards their fully becoming what they essentially are. To reach maturity is their telos , whether they make it or not. The burden of his Physics was to show how observed phenomena can be explained. In any situation where various entities are interacting, explanation begins by identifying each of them and then tracing back to their 'natures' the contribution each is making. Those natures, in turn, are explicable in terms of the medievals' 'four causes', which answer the four kinds of explanation we might ask about some phenomenon, as we noted in §2.6.
The medieval Aristotelians elaborated this way of thinking about things into a powerful model of scientific explanation. Given that each natural kind of thing has a 'natural' way of behaving, any phenomenon can be explained by identifying each agent (i.e., each entity, or 'substance') involved in that situation, determining the 'natural' input which each contributed, and explaining that 'natural behaviour' in terms of the 'essence' of each (its 'substantial form'), and then articulating that essence by citing their respective definitions. Finally, by reversing this procedure, one could deduce why what happened did (for a more detailed account, see Campbell 1992, 147-52) .
Whenever this explanatory model could be carried right through, it yielded explanations in a very strong sense. Conclusions validly deduced from premises follow necessarily, and when those premises are definitions, those conclusions are themselves necessary. This model admitted only two sources of contingency: a) it is contingent that some 'substantial form' is present in this lump of 'matter' rather than in some other; and b) it is contingent which agents happen to be operative in some given situation. But since it was held that 'matter' contributes nothing to the 'essence' of some 'substance' (entity), the second is the only source of contingency remaining. For the medievals, this model yielded the strongest form of knowledge: scientia -not just everyday cognitio .
There was not just one reason for the collapse of something so comprehensive and well thought-out as the medieval refinement of Aristotle's metaphysical framework. It came under attack in the 14th century for ascribing too much necessity to worldly phenomena; problems were found in its account of knowledge; and it came into conflict with a number of theological doctrines. But amongst the many reasons why
